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UNITED STATES OCEANS POLICY:
PERSPECTIVE 1974
H. Gary Knight*
I. Introduction
In 1967 the question of the adoption of new rules to govern the exploitation
of ocean resources and the use of ocean space, as well as amendment of existing
law of the sea conventions, was placed before the United Nations by the island
nation of Malta.' As a result, the international community has engaged during
the past six years in intensive discussions and negotiations concerning law of the
sea issues. During the past three years, the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction ("Seabed Committee" hereinafter) 2 has served as a preparatory
body for the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea ("Third
Conference" hereinafter)' presently scheduled to be held during April and May
of 1974. The negotiations leading to that conference, both within and without
the framework of the Seabed Committee, have not always gone smoothly. None-
theless, the schedule has been established, and the community of nations in-
tensified its effort during 1973 to come to grips with the complex issues involved
in the exploitation of ocean resources and the general use of ocean space.
* Associate Professor of Law and Marine Sciences, and Campanile Charities Professor of
Marine Resources Law, Louisiana State University Law Center; Member, Advisory Committee
on the Law of the Sea '(United States Government Inter-Agency Law of the Sea Task Force);
Program Coordinator, Louisiana State University Sea Grant Legal and Socio-Economic
Program.
The research for this article was supported partially by funds allocated by Campanile
Charities, Inc., for the Campanile Charities Professorship of Marine Resources Law, and
partially by funds from the Louisiana State University Sea Grant Program, a part of the
National Sea Grant Program (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department
of Commerce), under Grant No. 2-35231. The United States Government is authorized to
produce and distribute reprints hereof for governmental purposes notwithstanding any copy-
right notation that may appear hereon.
All of the comments made in this paper are my own personal interpretations and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the United States Government. Further, nothing contained in
this paper was imparted to me exclusively in connection with my service on the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Law of the Sea, and all comments are based on publicly available information.
1 Agenda Item 92 of the twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly
was entitled Declaration and Treaty Concerning the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful
Purposes of the Sea-Bed and of the Ocean Floor, Underlying the Seas Beyond the Limits of
Present National Jurisdiction, and the Use of Their Resources in the Interests of Mankind.
See U.N. Doc. A/6695, reprinted in House CoMm. ON FoRboN AFFAIRS, THE UNITED NA-
TIONS AND THE ISSUE oP DEEP OCEAN RESOURCES, H.R. REP. No. 999, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
7R (1967).
2 The Seabed Committee was established by G.A. Res. 2467 (XXXII) (1968). It
originally consisted of 42 nations, but membership was expanded to 86 in December, 1970,
G.A. Res. 2750-0 (XXV) '(1970), operative para. 5 and to 91 (including the People's
Republic of China) in 1971, G.A. Res. 2881 (XXVI) (1971), operative para. 3.
3 In December, 1970, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2750-C (XXV) (1970)
calling for the Third Conference to be held sometime during 1973 unless postponed by the
twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly in 1972 on grounds of insufficient progress of
preparatory work. By G.A. Res. 3029-A (XXVII) (1972) the Seabed Committee was in-
structed to hold two more preparatory sessions during 1973, a procedural meeting of the Third
Conference being scheduled for the winter, 1973.
4 G.A. Res. 3029-A (XXVII) (1972), operative para. 4. The site specified in the resolu-
tion for the Third Conference is Santiago, Chile, but the coup d'etat which occurred there in
September, 1973, makes it problematical that the meeting will be initiated there.
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As part of the negotiation process, the United States has during the past six
years developed and announced elements of a national oceans policy which it
seeks to implement through the agreements to be reached at the Third Con-
ference.' There are many factors which enter into the determination of national
policy, including the views of various industrial and other interest groups which
would be affected by changes in the law of the sea.' Although it is beyond the
scope of this article to examine all of the factors which entered into the policy
formulation process, it is my purpose to outline and discuss briefly the essential
elements of United States oceans policy on the eve of the convocation of the
Third Conference. It should be understood that the policies described in this
article were those extant as of August 31, 1973-it is quite possible that such
policies could be modified prior to initiation of the Third Conference.
In reviewing the elements of United States oceans policies, one should be
aware that the underlying premises leading to those policies have varied and, in-
deed, are still changing. Our policy began as a reaction to the Maltese initiative
in the United Nations and for a time was defensive in nature. It then developed
in response primarily to pressures from the Department of Defense and the ob-
jectives sought were, as one might expect, oriented essentially to national security
matters. Within the past two years there has been a shift away from defense
pressures and toward resource extractive interests. Thus, if the policies described
hereafter appear at times to have a patchwork quilt quality, it is not the fault of
the negotiators or the drafters of policy statements but rather the shifting winds of
emphasis generated by the Administration on matters foreign and domestic.
II. Sources of United States Policy
The development and exposition of United States foreign policy are a com-
plex process which seldom adheres to textbook methods or established lines of
executive authority.' I shall therefore set forth here the various sources and evi-
dences of oceans policy which I have considered in developing this article. Such a
presentation is designed to serve two purposes: (1) it is a caveat to the reader
concerning the sources of my conclusions, and (2) it is a bibliography for those
who might wish to pursue the matter of policy interpretation on their own.'
At the highest level presidential statements must be considered national
policy (at least in foreign affairs, and that is the area with which we are dealing
in the law of the sea negotiations). The principal presidential pronouncements
5 For an excellent analysis of the federal agency machinations involved in the evolution
of United States oceans policy, see Hollick, Seabeds Make Strange Politics, FOREIGN Poucy
'(No. 9) Winter 1972-73 at 148, and Holick, United States Oceans Politics, 10 SAN DiEGO
L. Rzv. 467 (1973). See also E. WENx, THE POLITICS OF THE OCEAN 250 (1972), Hollick,
The Law of the Sea and U.S. Policy Initiatives, 15 Orbis 670 (1971), and Maechling. The
Politics of the Ocean, 47 VA. Q. Rav. 505, 512-17 (1971).
6 For a discussion of the role of these interest groups in the formulation of United States
oceans policy, see Knight, The Role of United States Oceans Policy, in International Relations
and the Future of Ocean Space, Studies in International Affairs No. 10, Institute of Interna-
tional Studies, The University of South Carolina (1973).
7 For an account of the process with respect to United States oceans policy, see Hollick,
United States Oceans Politics, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 467, 480-85 (1973).
8 Footnotes 9 through 20 contain citations to all of the basic source materials involved in
United States oceans policy.
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on the topic of law of the sea have been President Johnson's statement at the
commissioning of the research vessel, The Oceanographer, in 1966' and President
Nixon's later, more comprehensive statement of May 23, 1970,1" a copy of which
appears at the conclusion of this article. Unfortunately, lawyers, scientists,
bureaucrats, and others are still quibbling about precisely what the latter state-
ment means in certain passages or why the federal government has or has not
(depending on who is speaking) emphasized certain aspects of the statement.
Thus, even at the highest level there appears some ambiguity on policy, although
in fairness it must be admitted that a certain amount of flexibility is always re-
quired in such policy positions. Additional expositions on United States oceans
policy have been made by President Nixon in each of his annual foreign policy
reports to Congress."
A second source of policy is the draft treaty articles which have been sub-
mitted from time to time to the Seabed Committee by the United States. In
August, 1970, the United States submitted a comprehensive draft seabed treaty. 2
This was followed a year later by a three-part proposal on the breadth of the
territorial sea, passage through straits, and fisheries.'3 A revised draft treaty
9 The President there stated:
Uinder no circumstances, we believe, must we ever allow the prospects of rich harvest
and mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among the maritime
nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the lands under
the high seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms are, and
remain, the legacy of all human beings.
The President's Remarks at the Commissioning of the New Research Ship, The "Oceanog-
rapher," July 13, 1966, 2 WxLY. COmp. PREs. Docs. 930, 931 (1966).
10 Nixon, United States Policy for the Seabed, 6 WKLY. CoMP. PaEs. Does. 677 (1970),
62 DEP'T STATE BULL. 737 (1970), 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 807 (1970). See also state-
ment of Elliot L. Richardson, Under Secretary of State, and testimony of John R. Stevenson,
Legal Adviser of the Department of State, in Hearings on Issues Related to Establishment of
Seaward Boundary of United States Outer Continental Shelf of the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, at 427 (1970) (hereinafter cited as
Continental Shelf Hearings).
11 Nixon, United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace, 6 WKLY.
CoMP. PREs. Docs. 194, 226 (1970), 62 DEP'T STATE BULL. 273, 314 (1970); Nixon, United
States Foreign Policy for the 1970'4: Building for Peace, 7 WKLY ComP. Pass. Does. 305, 370(1971), 64 DEP'T STATE BULL. 341, 423 (1971); Nixon, United States Foreign Policy for the
1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace, 8 WKLY CoMP. PRas. Docs. 235, 397 (1972), 66
DEP'T STATE BULL. 311, 409 (1972); Nixon, United States Foreign Policy for the 19 70's:Shaping a Durable Peace, 9 WxLY ComP. PRES. Docs. 455, 638 (1973), 68 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 715, 825 (1973). See also W. Rogers, UNITED STATES FOREIoN POLICY 1971: A REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE at 218-25, 304-07 (1972).
12 Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/25 (1970), 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1046 (1970); see also, the statement by
Christopher Phillips before the plenary session of the Seabed Committee, August 3, 1970,
introducing the draft seabed treaty, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SR.29-44 at 9 (1970); and Draft
U.N. Convention on the International Seabed Area: U.S. Working Paper Submitted to U.N.Seabed Committee, 63 DEP'T STATE BULL. 209 (1970). For comments on and analyses of this
proposal, both pro and con, see Knight, The Draft United Nations Conventions on the Inter-
national Seabed Area: Background, Description and Some Preliminary Thoughts, 8 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 459 (1971); Auburn, The International Seabed Area, 20 INT'L & Comp. L. Q. 173(1971); Gerstle, The U. N. and the Law of the Sea: Prospects for the United States Seabeds
Treaty, 8 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 573 '(1971); Stone, The United States Draft Convention on theInternational Seabed Area, 45 TUL. L. REv. 527 (1971); Jennings, The United States Draft
Treaty on the International Seabed Area-Basic Principles, 20 INT'L & Cosip. L. Q. 433(1971); The Nixon Proposal for an International Seabed Authority, 50 OR. L. REv. 599
1971); NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, PETROLEUM RESOURCES UNDER THE OCEAN FLOOR(supp. rept. 1971); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, OCEANS: THE NEW
FRONTIER (1971); 4 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW., pts. 3 & 4 pasvim (1971).13 Draft Articles on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea, Straits, and Fisheries Submitted
by the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.4 (1971); 10 INT'L
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article on fisheries was introduced at the July-August, 1972, meeting of the Sea-
bed Committee. 4 During the July-August, 1973, Seabed Committee meeting,
draft treaty articles were introduced on the subjects of protection of the marine
environment, 5 rights and duties of states in coastal seabed economic areas,"6
marine scientific research, 7 and compulsory dispute settlement. 8 These must be
regarded as having the highest official sanction, for their submission is permitted
only upon clearance by the National Security Council. Of equal value in assess-
ing United States policy positions are working papers submitted to the Seabed
Committee. Two such papers have been submitted: one dealing with fisheries&
and the other with pollution.'"
Congressional resolutions, though not carrying the force of law, must also
be considered as evidences of United States oceans policy, especially if they
endorse the policies being supported by the Executive Branch of government. In
1973 both the Senate and the House of Representatives adopted resolutions sup-
porting the basic outlines of United States oceans policy as reflected in presi-
dential statements and subsequent draft treaty articles.2'
Ranking perhaps below official draft articles, but extremely valuable for
their explanations and justifications of policy, are the formal statements made by
representatives of the United States to the Seabed Committee during its semi-
LEGAL MATERIALS 1013 '(1971). See also the statement by John R. Stevenson before Sub-
committee II of the Seabed Committee, August 3, 1971, introducing the draft articles, U.N.
Doe. A/AC. 138/SC.II/SR.4-23 at 45 (1971). On the proposals relating to the territorial sea
and straits, see Knight, The 1971 United States Proposals on the Breadth of the Territorial
Sea and Passage Through International Straits, 51 OR. L. REv. 759 (1972); on the United
States fishery proposal, see Christy, Fishery Problems and the U.S. Draft Article, PROcEEDINGS:
FOURTH NATIONAL SEA GRANT CONFERENCE 200 L. Weimer, T. Burroughs, and J. Katzel eds.
(1972).
14 United States Revised Draft Fisheries Article, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.9 (1972).
See also the statement by the Honorable Donald L. McKernan before Subcommittee II, of the
Seabed Committee, August 4, 1972, introducing the revised draft fisheries article, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.40, at 2 '(1972), and a subsequent statement on the same articles by
Herman Pollock, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.60, at 2 (1973).
15 United States Draft Articles on the Protection of the Marine Environment and the
Prevention of Marine Pollution, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.40 (1973). See also the
statement of John Norton Moore before Subcommittee III of the Seabed Committee, July 20,
1973, introducing the draft articles, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/SR.41, at 2 (1973).
16 United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Rights and Duties of
States in the Coastal Seabed Economic Area, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.35 (1973). See
also the statement of John R. Stevenson before Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee,
July 18, 1973, introducing the draft articles, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.65, at 11 (1973).
17 United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on Marine Scientific Research,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.44 (1973). See also the statement of Donald L. McKernan
before Subcommittee III of the Seabed Committee, July 20, 1973, introducing the draft
articles, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/SR.42, at 5, 16 (1973).
18 United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Settlement of Disputes,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/97 (1973).
19 Special Considerations Regarding the Management of Anadromous Fisheries and Highly
Migratory Oceanic Fishes: Working Paper Submitted by the United States of America, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.20 (1973) '(hereinafter cited as Fisheries Working Paper).
20 Competence to Establish Standards for the Control of Vessel Source Pollution: Working
Paper Presented by the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.36 (1973)(hereinafter cited as Pollution Working Paper).
21 S. Res. 82, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. S12810 (1973); H.R. Res. 330, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. H2310 (1973). See also Hearings on H. Res. 216 and 296
before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., (1973).
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annual sessions.22 Although the general principles contained in such messages are
cleared through the negotiating instructions approved by the National Security
Council, specific wording is generally left to the negotiating team-the Inter-
Agency Law of the Sea Task Force ("Task Force" hereinafter) -and its execu-
tive committee. 3 Also in this category are briefings and testimony given by
members of the Task Force in open congressional committee and subcommittee
sessions,24 and similar unclassified statements to the State Department's Advisory
Committee on the Law of the Sea.25 Finally, there are the miscellaneous ne-
gotiating, educational, and other activities in which members of the Task Force
and the United States delegation to the Seabed Committee must engage, whether
the Seabed Committee is in or out of session. These include impromptu responses
to policy statements by other nations (some made with more consultation and
preparation than others), unofficial conversations with representatives of other
nations, and speeches and papers before private and unofficial gatherings on the
subject.26
The policy picture is complicated by the fact that national positions tend to
change over the course of negotiations. Clearly, all that our negotiating team
22 See notes 12-17 for citations to the statements introducing the various United States
draft treaty articles and revisions thereof. Among the more recent and important additional
statements are those by John R. Stevenson, on August 10, 1972, U. N. Doc. A/AC.138/SR.77-
89, at 63, 67 STATE DEP'T BULL. 382 (1972), on United States policy as a whole; by John
Albers on March 22, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/SR.36, at 2 (1973) concerning
marine scientific research; by Philip Handler on March 29, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/
SC.III/SR.37 at 10 '(1973) also concerning scientific research; by John Norton Moore on
April 2, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.58 at 11 (1973) on the straits passage issue;
and by John R. Stevenson on July 25. 1973, U.N. Doc. AIAC.138/SC.II/SR.70 at 10 (1973)
also on the straits passage issue.
23 Concerning the nature and composition of the Task Force, see Hollick, supra note 5 at
491.
24 See, e.g., Hearings on Geneva U.N. Seabed Committee before the Subcommittee on
Oceanography of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 237, (1972); Hearings on Law of the Sea and Peaceful Uses of the Seabed before the
Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Hearings on Law of the Sea Before the Sub-
committee on Oceans and Atmosphere of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972); Continental Shelf Hearings, supra note 9; Hearings on S. 1134 before the
Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Hearings on S. 2801 before the Subcommittee on
Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1973); Hearings on S. Res. 33 before the Subcommittee on Ocean Space
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
25 The Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea was created in February, 1972, to
serve as an advisory body to the Chairman of the Task Force and the head of the United
States delegation to the Seabed Committee. It is presently composed of some sixty members
divided into eight subcommittees (petroleum, hard minerals, international finance and taxa-
tion, international law and relations, marine environment, fisheries, marine science, and mari-
time industries).
26 For examples of the latter, see Nordquist, International Legal Problems Involved in
Exploitation of Minerals in the Dee#. Ocean, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD--PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 1971 223 (V. Cameron, ed. 1971); Oxman, The Casefor the United States Draft Seabed Treaty, THE FAT. OF THE OCEANS 176 (Logue, ed. 1972);
Oxman, Report on the President's Proposal, THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE UNITED NATIONS AND
OCEAN MANAGEMENT 160 (L. Alexander 1971); L. Ratiner, National Security Interests in
Ocean Space, 4 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 582 (1971); Ratiner and Wright, United States
Ocean Mineral Resource Interests and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
6 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 1 (1973); Ratiner, United States Oceans Policy: An Analysis,
2 J. MAR. L. AND Comm. 225 (1971); Stevenson, Who Is to Control the Oceans?: U.S.
Policy and the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference, 6 THE INT'L LAW. 465 (1972) ; and Stevenson,
International Law and the Oceans, 62 DEP'T STATE BULL. 339 (1970).
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does should remain essentially consistent with President Nixon's statement of
May 23, 1970 (at least until a new oceans policy statement is issued) ; yet even
within that seemingly limited framework substantial flexibility has been evident.
The reader is thus cautioned that what follows is only one derivation of United
States oceans policy from among all the sources listed above.
III. Description and Discussion of Policy Objectives
Although the agenda of issues being considered in the current law of the
sea negotiations are quite lengthy,2" there appear to be five basic subject matter
areas which this nation is presently emphasizing through its policy proposals.
Two of these relate to the exploitation of resources of the marine environment,
while the other three relate to general uses of ocean space. They may be briefly
summarized as follows:
1. The question of the regime to govern exploration for and exploitation
of the nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil. This issue is
divided into two subparts: one concerns the regime applicable to the
area under adjacent coastal state jurisdiction, including the questions of
the extent of such national jurisdiction and the coastal state's rights and
duties with respect to activities conducted therein; the other concerns
the area beyond such national control, generally referred to as the "deep
seabed."
2. The question of management of living marine resources, wherever
situated. In some proposals, but not that of the United States, the issue
of the limits of national jurisdiction arises here, too.
3. The question of the breadth of the territorial sea and the con-
comitant right of navigation and overflight on the high seas and through
international straits.
4. The question of freedom of scientific research in the ocean.
5. The question of protection of the marine environment.
The underlying premises behind the various policy positions taken on these
issues were set forth in President Nixon's Third Annual Report on United States
Foreign Policy as follows:
First, multilateral agreement is essential ....
Second, freedom of navigation and overflight must be protected ....
Third, an equitable system must be established for regulating the
27 See, for example, the List of Subjects and Issues Relating to the Law of the Sea
adopted by Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee on August 16, 1972, U. N. Doe.
A/AC.138/83 at 18-21 (1972), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL M.ATRr ALs 1174 (1972). The
list which serves as the agenda for the Third Conference, contains 25 items, 61 sub-items, and
19 sub-sub-items.
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exploitation of the resources of the ocean and seabeds beyond nationaljurisdiction ....
Fourth, it is not possible for any nation, acting unilaterally, to ensure
adequate protection of the marine environment.
21
As will be seen, these elements form an essential basis of most of the positions
described below.
A. Nonliving Marine Resources
1. Areas Subject to Coastal State Jurisdiction
There are two basic issues to be negotiated in connection with this subtopic:
(a) the seaward extent of the area subject to coastal state jurisdiction, and
(b) the nature of the regime to govern nonliving resource extraction activities
conducted in that area. As to the first issue, governmental and nongovernmental
proposals have ranged from those which would limit coastal state jurisdiction to
extremely narrow areas to those which would afford national competence to the
edge of the continental margin and, in some cases, beyond. The initial United
States policy position on this question was taken in the 1970 presidential state-
ment and the ensuing draft seabed treaty" in which it was proposed that ex-
clusive national jurisdiction be limited to the two hundred meter isobath, that an
intermediate or trusteeship zone (to be administered by the coastal state but to
be considered as an international area) extend from the two hundred meter
isobath to the edge of the continental margin, and that the area beyond the mar-
gin be subject to international administration. This original proposal was largely
ignored in terms of responses from other delegations during subsequent meetings
of the Seabed Committee. During this period of "silent treatment" many of the
less developed countries began to believe that they could best serve their economic
interests by securing broad coastal state jurisdiction over both living and non-
living resources of the adjacent ocean area."0 Thus, the once unique two
hundred mile territorial sea and fisheries claims of Chile, Ecuador, and Perm
suddenly became the widely supported "patrimonial seas" or "economic resource
zones" of the early 1970's. There have been a number of different formulations
of the resource zone concept during the past two years and no single definitive
approach has yet been adopted."' However, the essence of all such proposals is
28 Nixon, United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace,
8 WxLxy. Comp. PRns. Docs. 235, 397-98 (1972), 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 312, 409-10 '(1972).
29 Supra, notes 10 and 12.
30 When the seabed question was first raised in the United Nations, glowing accounts were
widely circulated of vast wealth available from seabed resources. As a result, less developed
countries were initially inclined toward some sort of international regime which would include
revenue sharing or other methods of participation for nations without advanced marine tech-
nology. As more facts were developed about the value of marine mineral resources, however,
the economic return figures began to shrink, and more interest was expressed in the traditional
petroleum and natural gas resources available from relatively near shore areas. For a succinct
history of the seabed question see Knight, supra note 12, at 477-86.
31 Through August 6, 1973, economic resource zone proposals had been submitted to
the Seabed Committee by Kenya, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.10 (1972); Colombia,
Mexico, and Venezuela, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.21 (1973); Brazil, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/SC.II/L.25 (1972); Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.27
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that each coastal state should possess some form of exclusive or preferential right
over all living and non-living resources in the ocean adjacent to and a sub-
stantial distance seaward of its coast (200 miles or the edge of the continental
margin, whichever is further seaward, being the popular suggestion)."
It is in this context of growing support among less developed countries for
such an economic resource zone regime that one must view the apparent modifi-
cation of United States policy evidenced by the statement of the representative of
the United States delegation to the Seabed Committee on August 10, 1972, where
he observed:
[I]n order to achieve agreement, we are prepared to agree to broad
coastal state economic jurisdiction in adjacent waters and seabed areas
beyond the territorial sea as part of an overall law-of-the-sea settlement.8 3
The statement went on to note that "[w]e can accept virtually complete coastal
state resource management jurisdiction over resources and adjacent seabed areas
if this jurisdiction is subject to international treaty limitations in five respects."'
The qualifications are extremely important and constitute the element of this
nation's oceans policy which distinguishes it from those countries asserting more
absolute or exclusive maritime zones.3 5
During the July-August, 1973, meeting of the Seabed Committee, the
United States presented a concrete proposal elaborating on the general theme
which had been introduced a year earlier. The "Draft Articles for a Chapter on
the Rights and Duties of States in the Coastal Seabed Economic Area" provided
that the rights of the coastal state would include "the exclusive right to explore
and exploit and authorize the exploration and exploitation of the natural re-
sources of the seabed and subsoil in accordance with its own laws and regula-
tions .... ."-" The landward and seaward boundaries of the "Coastal Seabed
Economic Area" were deliberately left blank in keeping with past practice of
making the "limits" issue a flexible negotiating point.3 " However, in the tabling
(1972); Malta, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.28 (1972); China, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/
SC.II/L.34 (1972); Australia and Norway, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138.II./L.36 (1972); Argentina,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.37 '(1972); Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Nepal,
and Singapore, U.N. Doc. AIAC.138/SC.II/L.39 (1972); Algeria and thirteen other African
nations, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138.II/L.40 (1972); and Uganda and Zambia, U.N. Doc.
AIAC.138.II/L.41 (1972).
32 Almost all such proposals make clear that these resource zones are in no way intended
to interfere with the right of navigation on the high seas and are not to be confused with
claims of 200-mile territorial seas in which the adjacent coastal state asserts virtually complete
sovereignty. The United States Department of Defense is not particularly sanguine about
such provisions however, because of their fear of "creeping jurisdiction" (see post Part III.C
of text).
33 Statement of John R. Stevenson before the Seabed Committee, August 10, 1972, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.138/SR.77-89 at 63 (1972). On the apparent shift in United States seabed
policy, see Hollick, United States Oceans Politics, supra note 5 at 471-87.
34 Id.
35 There are in fact six qualifications to the United States acceptance of broad coastal
state seabed resource zones, for as Mr. Stevenson stated, the grant of jurisdiction must be
through international agreement as opposed to unilateral pronouncement or claim.
36 United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Rights and Duties of
States in the Coastal Seabed Economic Area, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.35 (1973).
37 Id. Art. 1(1).
38 Id. Art. 1(2).
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speech for the draft treaty articles, Mr. John R. Stevenson observed that the
generally preferred seaward limit was two hundred miles, although some states
preferred a seaward limit which would embrace the continental margin where
that margin extended beyond two hundred miles. In the summary of his state-
ment he mentioned that the United States "would welcome the opportunity of
continuing consultations with other States on that outer boundary [since] ...
a precise method of delimiting that area would have to be found."39 Concerning
the landward limit, Mr. Stevenson commented that simplicity and logic dictated
the seaward limit of the territorial sea, but that some account might have to be
taken of states' vested rights within the two hundred meter isobath under the
Convention on the Continental Shelf.4" Thus a landward limit of the economic
zone might consist of a distance of twelve miles or the two hundred meter iso-
bath, whichever was farther seaward. 1
The five elements referred to in Mr. Stevenson's August 10, 1972, statement,
and which are specified in the United States draft articles of July 16, 1973,
relate to: (1) maintenance of navigational rights, (2) protection of the marine
environment, (3) protection of investments, (4) revenue sharing, and (5) dis-
pute settlement. Because of their importance in the hierarchy of United States
oceans policy, each of these elements will be briefly examined. 2
First, the United States would like international standards to prevent un-
reasonable interference with other uses of the ocean as a result of the exercise
of resource jurisdiction by coastal states. The primary concern is that there be
no unreasonable interference with navigation, overflight, and other traditional
uses of the ocean as a result of resource extractive activities taking place in coastal
areas. The draft treaty articles provide that:
Nothing in this Chapter shall affect the rights of freedom of navigation and
overflight and other rights to carry on activities unrelated to seabed re-
source exploration and exploitation in accordance with general principles
of international law .... 43
[T]he coastal State shall ensure that there is no unjustifiable interference
with other activities in the marine environment...."
39 Statement of John R. Stevenson before Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee,
July 19, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.65 at 12 (1973).
40 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471 '(1964), T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (in force for U.S. June 10, 1964). Article 1 provides that the
continental shelf extends "to a depth of two hundred meters or, beyond that limit, to where
the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the
said areas... " Within that area, "[t]he coastal State exercises [exclusive] ... sovereign rights
for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources."
41 Statement of John R. Stevenson before Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee, July
19, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.65 at 13 (1973).
42 It is interesting to note that these same five (or six) elements also appeared in Pres-
ident Nixon's May 23, 1970, statement, so that although the United States has seemingly
retreated from its draft seabed treaty position on the technical question of limits, nonetheless
the nature of the jurisdictional animal being created remains consistent with the original policy
statement of the United States.
43 United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Rights and Duties of
States in the Coastal Seabed Economic Area, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.35 (1973).
44 Id. Art. 2(a).
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All activities in the marine environment shall be conducted with reason-
able regard to the rights of the coastal State .... 45
In putting forward these draft articles, the United States is evidencing its con-
cern-almost preoccupation-with a loosely defined phenomenon called "creep-
ing jurisdiction" in which a coastal state's limited jurisdiction purportedly tends
to grow through the gradual addition of more "rights" and "interests," into a
virtual territorial sea. The United States is therefore unwilling to accept further
expanded jurisdiction over high seas areas unless there are adequate guarantees
preserving naval and commercial vessel mobility in any such regime. Our
interest in navigation and overflight is primarily a national security matter which
will be considered later in relation to other security issues.
The United States has recognized the need in certain situations for regula-
tion of navigation and has therefore included in its draft articles provisions re-
lating to navigation near offshore installations (see also the United States pro-
posals concerning coastal state jurisdiction over navigation with respect to pas-
sage through international straits, Part III C). The coastal state is authorized
to establish reasonable safety zones around the permitted offshore insallations,
but such zones must comply with international standards in existence or to be
promulgated by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
("IMCO" hereinafter) "regarding the breadth, if any, of safety zones around
offshore installations [and] regarding navigation outside the safety zones, but in
the vicinity of offshore installations.""
Second, the United States seeks international standards to protect the ocean
from pollution. The draft articles provide that:
[T]he coastal State shall take appropriate measures to prevent pollution
of the marine environment from the activities set forth in Article 1 and shall
ensure compliance with international standards in existence or promulgated
by the [International Seabed Resource] Authority or the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, as appropriate, to prevent such pol-
lution.4 7
Further discussion of this issue will be postponed until Part III E.
Third, the United States seeks international standards to protect the integ-
rity of investment in the marine environment. The object is to protect the
inevitable investment in offshore petroleum and natural gas resources of de-
veloping countries by the petroleum industries. The United States is particularly
sensitive to the expropriation issue at this time in view of recent petroleum,
copper, and other industry seizures in Latin America. It is hoped that treaty
provisions can be imposed on the coastal states' resource jurisdiction over broad
marine areas which will guarantee the integrity of investments made by foreign
companies. The new draft treaty articles provide on this point that:
45 Id. Art. 3(1).
46 Id. Arts. 1 (4) and 3(2).
47 Id. Art. 2(b).
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Whe coastal State shall ensure that licenses, leases, or other contractual
arrangements which it enters into with the agencies or instrumentalities of
other States, or with natural or juridical persons which are not nationals
of the coastal State, for the purpose of exploring for or exploiting seabed
resources are strictly observed according to their terms. Property of such
agencies, instrumentalities or persons shall not be taken except for a public
purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis, nor shall it be taken without the
prompt payment of just compensation. Such compensation shall be in an
effectively realizable form and shall represent the full equivalent of the
property taken and adequate provision shall have been made at or prior to
the time of the taking to ensure compliance with the provisions of this
paragraph.4 8
To make such a provision effective, it must have teeth; there are a number of
possibilities for making such a guarantee meaningful including denying any
infringing coastal state participation in a revenue sharing program with respect
to offshore resources. United States policy with respect to this detail has not
yet surfaced.
Fourth, and as alluded to in the last paragraph, the United States seeks
sharing of revenues derived from seabed exploitation for international commu-
nity purposes. The draft treaty articles provide that:
WThe coastal State shall make available in accordance with the provi-
sions of Article -, such share of revenues in respect of mineral resource
exploitation from such part of the Coastal Seabed Economic Area as is
specified in that Article.40
It is not clear from precisely which offshore areas such revenues would come.
One possibility is that revenues generated from resource production landward of
the two hundred meter isobath, an area already under exclusive national juris-
diction pursuant to the Convention on the Continental Shelf,5" would not be
involved. Rather, some percentage of revenues derived from production between
the two hundred meter isobath and the two hundred mile (or other) limit of
an economic resource zone would be shared, and all such revenues beyond the
two hundred mile limit would be earmarked for international purposes. Of in-
terest is the statement made by Mr. Stevenson in his August 10 presentation,
that the United States was repeating its revenue sharing offer as part of an over-
all settlement despite the conclusion that "a significant portion of the total inter-
national revenues will come from the continental margin off the United States
in early years. 51
Finally, the United States seeks argeement on a system of peaceful and
compulsory settlement of disputes in any area subject to national jurisdiction.
In its original draft seabed treaty, the United States set forth in some detail
provisions for a tribunal to settle disputes arising out of matters relating to the
48 Id. Art. 2'(d).
49 Id. Art. 2 (e).
50 See text accompanying note 39 supra.
51 Statement of John R. Stevenson before the Seabed Committee, August 10, 1972, supra
note 22.
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seabed treaty then envisioned.5" Although little debate on dispute settlement
procedures took place within the context of a seabed treaty in the Seabed Com-
mittee subsequent to the United States proposal, Mr. Stevenson stated on August
10, 1972, that "the principle of compulsory dispute settlement is essential." The
draft treaty articles on the rights and duties of states in the seabed economic
area provide that "[a]ny dispute with respect to the interpretation or application
of the provisions of this chapter shall, if requested by either party to the dispute,
be resolved by the compulsory dispute settlement procedures contained in [the
treaty ] .,,
On August 22, 1973, the United States introduced draft treaty articles on
the subject of compulsory dispute settlement.54 The draft articles provide for
the use of the classical methods of dispute settlement (negotiation, good offices,
mediation, conciliation, and arbitration), but also provide that notwithstanding
the availability of these procedures, "any Contracting Party which is a party to
a dispute relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention which
is required by this Convention to be submitted to compulsory dispute settlement
procedures on the application of one of the parties, may refer the dispute at
any time to the Law of the Sea Tribunal."55 The Tribunal's judges are to be
selected through procedures similar to those used by the International Court of
Justice and are to be lawyers of recognized competence in law of the sea matters;
further, the Tribunal may be assisted by technical assessors when disputes involve
technical questions.
The United States oceans policy position with respect to coastal state juris-
diction over nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil appears then to be
that the United States would support the patrimonial sea or economic resource
zone concept, including its extension to a breadth of two hundred miles (or
beyond, to the limit of the continental margin), provided that such a regime be
established by international treaty agreement and further provided that such
an agreement contain satisfactory provisions with respect to the five elements
identified and discussed above. Virtually all debate concerning the economic
resource zone concept to date has turned about the question of exploitation of
oil, gas, sulphur, and other minerals from the seabed and subsoil. However,
another facet of United States policy with respect to economic zones relates to
nonextractive uses of ocean space, particularly the construction and operation
of facilities utilizing artificial installations. A portion of the draft treaty articles
on rights and duties of states in the economic zone was therefore devoted to this
issue, which itself was generated by a Nixon Administration decision to pursue
the alternative of increased crude oil imports as a short-term solution to the
so-called energy crisis. 6 Since the use of deep draft port and harbor facilities
52 Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/L.25 Arts. 46-60 (1970).
53 United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Rights and Duties of
States in the Coastal Seabed Economic Area, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.35 Art. 5 (1973).
54 United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Settlement of Disputes,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/Sc.II/L.20 (1973).
55 Id. Art. 2.
56 For an analysis of the energy issue as well as the rationale behind the supertanker-
superport approach to the problem, see Knight, International Legal Problems in the Construc-
tion and Operation of Offshore Deep Draft Port Facilities, in HAZARDS OF MARTrriME NAVIoA-
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constructed outside the limit of the territorial sea appears to be the most efficient
method of importing crude oil, a part of the United States oceans policy position
has now become the legitimization in international law of the construction and
operation of such facilities.
The draft treaty articles provide that in addition to resource exploration
and exploitation rights, the coastal state shall have the right in the economic
zone to authorize and regulate (a) the construction, operation and use of off-
shore installations affecting its economic interests, and (b) drilling for purposes
other than exploration and exploitation of resources.57 Further provisions of the
draft articles specify that the coastal state may establish reasonable safety zones
around such installations," that such installations do not possess the status of
islands and that they therefore have no territorial sea or economic resource zone
of their own," and that their presence does not affect the delimitation of the
territorial sea.6' This authorization is sufficiently general to extend beyond the
"superport" concept and would presumably encompass such enterprises as float-
ing airports and cities, offshore power installations, artificial reefs, multipurpose
"sea islands," and even the stationing of icebergs towed from Antarctica to be
used as sources of fresh water for the adjacent land mass and its population.
2. The Deep Seabed
Assuming that some agreement can be reached on the seaward extent of
national jurisdiction, there still remains the question of the regime to govern
extraction of resources of the seabed and subsoil beyond that limit. At present
the petroleum and natural gas potential of such an area is highly speculative.
However, the exploitation of manganese nodules for their primary metals content
of nickel, manganese, copper, and cobalt appears to be commercially feasible
within this decade, perhaps within the next three to five years, given the proper
legal/institutional environment.
As already noted, in the fall, 1970, the United States proposed a com-
prehensive regime to govern exploitation of the deep seabed mineral resources.
On the issue of seabed policy, the United States representative to the Seabed
Committee stated on August 10, 1972:
The basic interests we seek to protect in an international seabed regime
are reflected in the five points to which I referred earlier, coupled with our
proposal for international machinery to authorize and regulate exploration
and use of the resources of the area."-
Thus, most of the negotiation under way now on this topic turns about the pre-
TioN (L. Alexander ed. 1973); Knight, International Legal Aspects of Deep Draft Harbor
Facilities, 4 J. MAEuTrE L. & COMM. 367 (1973).
57 United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Rights and Duties of
States in the Coastal Seabed Economic Area, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.35 Art. 1(3)(1973).
58 Id. Art. 1(4).
59 Id. Art. 1(5) (b).
60 Id.
61 Statement by John R. Stevenson before the Seabed Committee, August 10, 1972, supra
note 22.
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else nature of the international machinery, the composition of its decision mak-
ing authority, 2 the rules under which it will dispose of resources under its juris-
diction, the nature and objectives of revenue sharing, and other details.6 Pro-
posals have been introduced in the Seabed Committee, however, which the
United States feels are outside its range of acceptable seabed policies. One such
prosopal, made by a group of Latin American nations, would authorize the inter-
national seabed agency itself (or in joint ventures with stages or companies)
to exploit the seabed resources. 4 A cornerstone of United States seabed policy
is firm opposition to any proposal of this nature. Mr. Stevenson, in his August
10, 1972, speech stated:
[W]e believe it is important to dispel any possible misconceptions that
my Government would agree to a monopoly by an international operating
agency over deep seabed exploitation or to any type of economic zone that
does not accommodate basic United States interests with respect to resources
as well as navigation. 65
One is thus led to the conclusion that so long as the five principles enunciated
in connection with coastal state jurisdiction are incorporated, and some form of
international machinery which will give appropriate decisional authority to
technologically advanced states and avoid creation of an agency monopoly is
developed, the United States is relatively flexible at this time on the elements
of a seabed regime.
Another essential element of United States seabed policy is that this nation
favors, for the time being at least, international rather than national solutions
to the problem of the absence of an economically secure regime to govern the
mining of manganese nodules. Bills were introduced in the Ninety-Second Con-
gresses and reintroduced in the Ninety-Third Congress67 which would, through
reciprocal national legislation, create a system, administered by each participating
nation only with respect to its own nationals, permitting exploration for and
exploitation of seabed minerals. Although it is undeniable that the mere intro-
duction of such bills and the strong support evidenced by the domestic mining
62 The United States has proposed a 24-member Council, divided into groups of 6 and 18,
the former constituted of nations with the highest gross national products, the latter constituted
of developing nations (with representation for landlocked states). To take affirmative action, a
majority of both groups, in addition to a majority of the whole, would be required. For an
analysis of various proposals for the governing body of an international seabed authority, see
Sohn, The Council of an International Sea-Bed Authority, 9 SAN DIEoo L. REv. 404 '(1972).
63 For an in-depth identification and analysis of the elements of the United States Draft
United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area concerning these issues, see
Knight, supra note 12, at 496-534.
64 Working Paper on the Regime for the Sea Bed and Ocean Floor and Its Subsoil Beyond
the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/49 (1971).
65 Statement by John R. Stevenson before the Seabed Committee, August 10, 1972, supra
note 22.
66 S. 2801 and H.R. 13904, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); See, Hearings on Deep Seabed
Hard Mineral Resources (H.R. 13904) before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); and Hear-
ings on S. 2801 before the Subcommittee on *Minerals, Materials, and Fuels of the Senate Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). No action was taken by
either subcommittee on the bills during the ninety-second session of Congress.
67 S. 1134 and H.R. 9, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) are identical in language to their
predecessors in the Ninety-Second Congress.
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industry' gave impetus to more progressive action in developing an international
seabed regime in the Seabed Committee, their passage could easily prejudice
current negotiations-and United States oceans policy--by encouraging uni-
lateral responses from developing coastal states with respect to near shore re-
sources.6" In testimony on March 1, 1973, before the Subcommittee on Oceanog-
raphy, House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, the Administration
took a position in opposition to enactment of such bills until such time as either
(1) it becomes clear that unsatisfactory progress is being made toward adoption
of an international seabed regime in the current negotiations or (2) the Third
Conference has concluded without taking appropriate action on the subject."
In view, however, of the rapid developments in technology, the United
States indicated in both its March 1, 1973, congressional testimony and its
March 19, 1973, statement in Subcommittee I of the Seabed Committee that it
favored provisional entry into force of those portions of the permanent seabed
regime and machinery applicable to deep seabed mineral development. The
essential objective of this aspect of national oceans policy is to ensure that the
short-term development of seabed minerals is done in accordance with the inter-
national regime to be agreed upon. The advantages of such a system of provi-
sional entry into force of the seabed treaty are that:
It would enable nations to gain benefits from resource development prompt-
ly; it would provide an opportunity to collect and disseminate information
on the technology and impact of resource development in its early growth
years; it would substantially expedite the preparation of detailed annexes
to the treaty, which would then be promulgated by the permanent machin-
ery and could be judged against the background of a sound data base
acquired during the provisional period; it would ensure that the resources
were developed under international administration from the start; and it
would stimulate States to expedite the ratification process.7 1
In response to the United States initiative for a provisional regime, the Seabed
Committee forwarded to the United Nations Secretariat a recommendation for
a report which would describe "examples of precedents of provisional appli-
cation, pending their entry into force, of all or part of multilateral treaties.... 2
68 For an exposition of the industry view, see Humphreys, An International Regime for
the Exploration for and Exploitation of the Resources of the Deep Seabed-The United States
Hard Mineral Industry Position, 5 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 731 '(1972).
69 For divergent views of these seabed mining bills, see, Knight, The Deep Seabed Hard
Mineral Resources Act-A Negative View, 10 SAN DIEGo L. Rv. 446 (1973), and Laylin,
The Law to Govern Deepsea Mining Until Superseded by International Agreement, 10 SAN
DiEGo L. Rpv. 433 (1973). See also Laylin, The Legal Regime of the Deep Seabed Pending
Multinational Agreement, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 317 (1973), and Laylin, Past, Present and Future
Development of the Customary International Law of the Sea and Deep Seabed, 5 THE Izrq'L
LAw. 442 (1971).
70 Statement of Charles N. Brower, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, and Acting
Chairman, Inter-Agency Task Force on the Law of the Sea, before the Subcommittee on
Oceanography of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., March 1, 1973, and Supplemental Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner, Director for Ocean
Resources, Department of the Interior.
71 Statement of John Norton Moore before Subcommittee I of the Seabed Committee,
March 19, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.I/SR.64 at 15 (1973).
72 See, Recommendation of Sub-Committee I Adopted at Its 66th Meeting Held on 27
March 1973, U.N. Doe. A/AC.138/SC.I/L.20 (1973).
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The Secretariat's study was presented to the Seabed Committee during its July-
August, 1973, meeting in Geneva and identified a number of such precedents,
thus increasing the probability that such a course of action would ultimately be
adopted.7
B. Fisheries
The United States has historically opposed the practice and has challenged
the international legality of the unilateral extension of exclusive fisheries zones
beyond reasonably narrow limits. 4 For many years this nation asserted that no
state could exercise exclusive fisheries jurisdiction beyond the then widely ac-
cepted three mile territorial sea. However, as part of a rising tide of unilaterally
extended exclusive fisheries jurisdiction zones, the United States adopted in 1966
a fisheries zone extending twelve miles from the coastline. 5 Accordingly, this
nation now acknowledges the right of coastal states to extend their fisheries juris-
diction to that distance. However, the United States has been adamant in its
opposition to the exercise or assertion of exclusive coastal state jurisdiction over
fisheries beyond the twelve mile limit and has continued to oppose claims and
acts by Latin American, African, and other nations which have sometimes re-
suilted in the seizure of United States fishing vessels.
One of the difficulties in developing a uniform national policy on inter-
national fisheries is that the fisheries industry is bifurcated. The majority of our
fishing effort goes into "coastal" fisheries, i.e., living resources located relatively
near our own shores. However, a substantial portion of the industry is distant
water oriented, fishing for shrimp off the coasts of Latin American nations and
for tuna in the South Pacific and East Atlantic oceans. Thus any policy de-
veloped by the United States must seek to preserve the economic interests of
both sections of the domestic fishing industry."'
It is also worth noting, before elaborating on United States fisheries policy,
that the resumption of hostilities between the United Kingdom and Iceland,
initiated by Iceland's extension of its exclusive fisheries zone to fifty miles on
September 1, 1972," has resulted in this dispute being submitted to the Inter-
national Court of Justice."8 The I.C.J. is not known for the blinding speed
73 Examples of Precedents of Provisional Application, Pending Their Entry into Force, of
Multilateral Treaties, Especially Treaties Which Have Established International Organizations
and/or Regimes, U.N. Doe. A/AC.138/88 (1973).
74 See, e.g., Herrington, U.S. Policy on Fisheries and Territorial Waters, 26 DE'T STATE
BULL. 1021 (1952).
75 Exclusive Fisheries Zone Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1094 (Supp. 1973). The Act estab-
lished a fisheries zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States in which this
nation "exercises the same exclusive rights in respect to fisheries .. as it has in its territorial
sea." 16 U.S.C. § 1091 (Supp. 1973).
76 With this one exception, I have not in this article identified the various industrial and
special group interests which are materially assisting in shaping United States oceans policy.
For a treatment of that subject, see Knight, The Role of Special Domestic Interests in the
Formulation of United States Oceans Policy, supra note 6.
77 Ministry of Fisheries of Iceland, Regulations of July 14, 1972, Concerning the Fishery
Limits Off Iceland, effective September 1, 1972; reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATEIALs 1112
(1972).
78 The I.C.J. issued an interim order in the case on August 17, 1972 [reprinted in 11
INT'L LEGAL MATEPIALS 1069 (1972)]. On August 18, 1972, it directed that the first plead-
ings be addressed to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the dispute [re-
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-with which it reaches decisions, but it is possible that the I.C.J. would issue an
opinion on the merits prior to completion of the Third Conference which could
have a profound effect on the outcome of the current negotiations with respect
to fisheries.
The United States position on fisheries, which constitutes a clear departure
from past national practices, is contained in the draft treaty article on fisheries
submitted to the Seabed Committee during its July-August, 1971, session,"h and
as revised for submission to the July-August, 1972, session." The essential ele-
ments of the revised position include:
(1) Coastal states will have regulatory (conservation) authority over
and preferential rights to all coastal species off their coasts, to the limits
of their migratory range. The same principle is applicable to anadro-
mous species with the preference going to the state in whose fresh waters
they spawn.
(2) Coastal states are obligated to provide access by other states to any
portion of such resources not fully utilized by the coastal state, with
appropriate priorities to states which have traditionally fished the re-
source or states in the region, including landlocked states.
(3) Coastal and anadromous resources which are located in or migrate
through waters adjacent to more than one coastal state are to be regu-
lated by agreement among the affected states (the revised proposal
contains sections on enforcement and dispute settlement to provide the
framework for this cooperative process).
(4) Highly migratory oceanic resources (tuna, whales, etc.) are to be
regulated by international fishery organizations.
(5) The conservation standard is to be maximum sustainable yield,
taking into account relevant environmental and economic factors.
This "species approach" has the advantage of treating the biologic unit as a
whole rather than subjecting it to a plethora of jurisdictions or irrational (in the
biologic sense) boundaries. In the words of the summary of an explanatory
statement of the United States fisheries position:
i[The legal regime for the management of marine fisheries must, if it
is to be most effective in achieving the conservation and rational utilization
printed in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATEniALS 1077 '(1972)], and on February 2, 1973, held that it
had jurisdiction to entertain the application fied and to deal with the merits of the dispute
[decision reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATEaAS 290 (1973)]. For a definitive article on the
dispute, see Bilder, The Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Dispute, 1973 Wxsc. L. Rav. 37 (1973).
See also Katz, Issues Arising in the Icelandic Fisheries Case, 22 INTL & CoMp. L. Q. 83
(1973).
79 Draft Articles on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea, Straits, and Fisheries Submitted by
the United States of America, U.N. Doec. A/AC.138.II/L.4 '(1971).
80 United States Revised Draft Fisheries Article, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.9 (1972).
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of the resources, take into account the essential differences and characteris-
tics of individual fishery resources which determine the type of management
systems best suited to them, respectively. a
The species approach categorizes marine fishes into three groups: coastal, anad-
romous, and highly migratory oceanic. The first category, coastal, being located
primarily in waters above the continental margin, is "peculiarly susceptible of
management by the coastal state or when its distribution or coastwise migra-
tion makes it appropriate, by neighboring coastal states working together.""2
The position on coastal species was further elaborated in these words:
[T]hese are the species upon which local, coastal fishermen are exclu-
sively dependent because of the small size, short range, and limited carrying
capacity typical of their vessels. Aside from the food source such fisheries
provide, they also have important social and economic implications which
are often more important to the coastal state than the efficient production
of raw protein.93
The position of the United States on the second category of fish, anadromous
species," was set forth in some detail in the Fisheries Working Paper.5
In developing its position the United States noted that: (1) anadromous
species are highly dependent "upon the maintenance by their 'host' state of a
suitable environment for a key position of their life history";"8 (2) this depen-
dence upon the freshwater environment posed "survival hazards not faced by
purely marine species";"7 that (3) these hazards--or mortality factors 8 --can
be overcome only at a great deal of expense; and (4) host states have tended
to invest heavily in the required protective activities. The economic and biologic
bases for the United States position in favor of preferences for coastal states
with respect to the harvesting of anadromous species are that: the distinct
stocks and substocks of anadromous species have unique genetic pools which
must be separately managed in order to avoid eliminating stocks which have
not fared well in the freshwater environment during a particular year, and that
the fish are at their largest just before re-entering fresh water." Thus, the United
States position paper concludes:
81 Statement of Howard W. Pollock before Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee,
April 4, 1973, Press Release (United States Mission to the United Nations) USUN-31(73)/at
1; summary in U.N. Doc A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.60 at 2 (1973).
82 U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.60 at 2 (1973).
83 Id.
84 Anadromous species are defined in the United States working paper on the subject as
those which require a fresh-water environment for their spawning, egg incubation, and, in most
cases, the rearing of juveniles, and upon the marine environment for the majority of their
growth and maturation. Among anadromous species are the Pacific and Atlantic salmons,
trouts, shads, striped bass, smelts, and sturgeons.
85 Fisheries Working Paper, supra note 19.
86 Fisheries Working Paper, supra note 19. at 2.
87 Id. at 3.
88 Among the mortality factors cited were natural obstacles to upstream migration (land-
slides, log jams), man-made obstacles (hydroelectric and flood control dams), diversion of
water for irrigation or industrial use, thermal pollution, silting of spawning gravel, and oxygen
deficits caused by sewage and other biodegradable wastes.
89 Fisheries Working Paper, supra note 19, at 4-5.
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Bearing in mind these two considerations--the need for independent
management of individual genetic units which are intermingled during most
bf their marine existence and the net increase in biomass during at least
the latter part of the marine existence-a high seas fishery for salmon is
unsound both in terms of the economics of the fisheries and the biology of
the animals.90
The basis for affording the state in whose fresh waters anadromous species
spawn the preference was then based on the economic investment argument out-
lined earlier. The United States delegate asserted:
What justifies giving the host state sole management authority is the
fact that if it is to take the appropriate measures in its inland waters, it
must be assured that salmon will be harvested close to the coast, and not
in the open ocean where the salmon races intermingle and thus cannot be
rationally managed.91
The third category of fish-highly migratory oceanic fishes 9 2-have exten-
sive migratory ranges. This dictates that the fishing vessels pursuing such species
also be able to move rapidly and freely over extensive ocean areas. The United
States position suggests that although agreement might be reached on the rights
of access necessary for the harvest of such species in the waters of one nation's
two hundred mile economic resource zone by the vessels of another nation, "the
practice of the two hundred mile zone doctrine-as opposed to its theory-has
not been such as to lead one to find much comfort in that argument. '9 The
Fisheries Working Paper concludes that:
When such artificial constraints [as exclusive fishing zones] are imposed
on the freedom of movement of tuna vessels, efficiency drops, catches are
reduced, the supply available to mankind is diminished, and what supply
there is, is available at a higher cost-a higher cost not only to the con-
sumer, but to the world as a whole.94
The paper also observed that the requirements of scientific research and the
application of conservation measures with respect to such species were also ill
served by national jurisdictional exclusivity. 5 With respect, for instance, to a
conservation system based on national quotas, the Fisheries Working Paper sug-
gested that "Since the populations do occur in several national jurisdictions and
also beyond and they are fished by nationals of several countries, the application
of such a co-ordinated quota requires international management of the fishery
for conservation purposes."9 It is obvious that the economic and biologic argu-
ments advanced by the United States in favor of coastal state preferences for
90 Id. at 5.
91 Statement of Howard W. Pollock, supra note 80, at 5.
92 Highly migratory oceanic fishes are defined in the Fisheries Working Paper as being
characterized by extremely broad distributional ranges and large-scale, often transoceanic,
migrations. The prime example is, of course, the tunas.
93 Fisheries Working Paper, supra note 19, at 8.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 8-10.
96 Id. at 10.
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anadromous species and international management for highly migratory oceanic
fishes are sound. It is also obvious that these arguments were developed in an
effort to protect specific United States fishery industry interests--viz., the salmon
and tuna industries, respectively-and not out of an altruistic desire to achieve
rational fisheries management. Thus, the acceptance of the "species" approach
turns as much on the perceptions by other nations of what self-interests are being
served in the United States position on fisheries as it does on the biologic/
economic logic of the position.
Should the United States be unable to sell its species approach, it is clear
that there is room in United States oceans policy for acceptance of the zonal
approach. There is certainly much support in industry and in Congress for
immediate imposition of a zonal approach (a two hundred mile limit) in order
to conserve rapidly diminishing fishery resources off the coast of the United
States."7 Although unilateral action is unlikely at the present time (a two hun-
dred mile bill passed by Congress would very likely receive a presidential veto
because of current oceans policy and the ongoing negotiations leading to the
Third Conference), it seems almost a certainty should the Third Conference
fail to produce some acceptable agreement on international fisheries manage-
ment issues.
The United States policy on fisheries was summed up at the July-August,
1972, meeting of the Seabed Committee as follows:
[O]ur basic interest is to assure rational use and conservation of all fish
stocks. To achieve this, we believe coastal States should have substantial
jurisdiction over all fisheries, including anadromous species, except where
the migratory habits of certain fish stocks dictate another system. . . . In
coastal areas jurisdiction should be limited by such international standards
as would assure conservation and full utilization of the living resources....
Thus, we can support broad coastal State jurisdiction over coastal and
anadromous fisheries beyond the territorial sea subject to international
standards designed to insure conservation, maximum utilization and equi-
table allocation of fisheries, with compulsory dispute settlement, but with
international regulation of high migratory species such as tuna.""
This, one presumes, is the "word" on United States fisheries policy, yet the lan-
guage contains a sufficient measure of flexibility to prevent any hard conclusions
about the limits to which the nation's negotiators might be willing to go for
the sake of agreement.
C. Territorial Sea Breadth: Navigation and Overflight
on the High Seas and Through International Straits
Two major United States interest groups-the Department of Defense
97 See, e.g., H.R. 200 and S. 380, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 1973, which would extend the
United States exclusive fishery zone from 12 to 200 miles or to the outer limits of the con-
tinental shelf, respectively. See also H.R. 9137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.. 1973, which would extend
the United States exclusive fishery zone to 200 miles on an interim basis, pending conclusion of
a suitable international agreement.
98 Statement of John R. Stevenson, August 10, 1972, supra note 22, at 64.
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.and the commercial maritime community-have a significant stake in the out-
-come of the Third Conference with respect to issues concerning freedom of navi-
gation on the high seas. The importance of maintaining a free flow of commerce
on the seas cannot be overemphasized. This has been highlighted by the so-
-called "energy crisis" and the recent decision to increase ocean-borne shipments
of crude oil from the Middle East to alleviate present and impending shortages
of power for our industrial society. But beyond the obvious high profile issues
-there exists a continuous, intricate, and essential exchange of commodities among
nations which takes place primarily, indeed almost exclusively, at sea. To dis-
rupt that exchange by imposing additional costs or other burdens to maritime
-commerce would be to disrupt the basis for our present civilization. To the
,extent that United States oceans policy seeks to avoid the imposition of addi-
tional costs or burdens to maritime commerce, it is in keeping with high ideals
.and sound logic. Yet the navigation issue was first raised in the development
of United States oceans policy in the context of the needs and desires of the
Department of Defense, not the commercial maritime community. I have
therefore developed this portion of the article in terms of defense interests, for
in expounding its policy on this issue the United States has, rightly or wrongly,
irrevocably tied the question of free navigation to its world military position.
The Department of Defense has from the outset played an instrumental
role in developing current United States oceans policy.99 The primary concerns
of the Department of Defense are twofold: (1) that the world ocean remain
available for free and unimpeded navigation of naval vessels, and (2) that the
seabed beneath the world ocean beyond the continental shelves remain available
for the implantation of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) tracking and detection
devices.
The matter of securing access to the seabed for implantation of ASW
tracking and detection devices is dealt with in the United States draft seabed
treaty where "other uses" of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
are to be kept open on a non-exclusive basis."' 0 Article III of the draft seabed
treaty provides that the International Seabed Area-the area beyond the two
hundred meter isobath line-shall be open to use by all states, without discri-
mination, except where otherwise provided by the Convention. The draft treaty
provides "otherwise" only with respect to exploration and exploitation of certain
natural resources, presumably leaving all other uses to be covered by the "open
to use by all States" provision. As noted by a United States representative, 1
"[t]he rights of states to conduct activities other than exploration and exploi-
tation of natural resources in the International Trusteeship Area and beyond
would be expressly protected by the convention.... .I"
The issues of the breadth of the territorial sea and free transit through inter-
national straits were covered in Articles I and II of the three part draft treaty
submitted to the Seabed Committee in 197 1."3 Those articles provide for a maxi-
99 On this point, see the authorities cited in note 5.
100 Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area, supra note 12.
101 See Statement by John R. Stevenson, Draft U.N. Convention on the International Sea-
bed Area: U.S. Working Paper Submitted to U.N. Seabeds Committee, supra note 12.
102 Id. at 210.
103 Supra note 78.
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mum breadth for the territorial sea of twelve nautical miles, and a right of
transit through international straits equivalent to that now in force on the high
seas, including the rights of submerged passage and overflight. This position
was supposedly necessitated by the fact that a large number of straits now con-
taining corridors of high seas, thus ensuring an unimpeded right of passage,
would become entirely territorial waters if the breadth of the territorial sea were
extended to twelve miles. The demand for free transit through such waters has
been made a nonnegotiable cornerstone of the United States position. In a
speech before Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee during its July-August,.
1971, meeting, the United States representative stated that his Government
"would be unable to conceive of a successful Law of the Sea Conference that
did not accommodate the objectives of these Articles."'0 4 Such a proposal de-
parts substantially from the existing international law on the subject which
recognizes only a right of innocent passage (defined as passage which is not prej-
udicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state) through inter-
national straits comprised of territorial areas. 5 Further, under present law,
submarines are required to navigate on the surface and show their flags when
transiting such straits.. 6 and overflight is not included as an incident of innocent
passage. Thus, this nation is seeking substantial changes in the present inter-
national law with regard to the right of passage through straits.
Negative responses to the straits and territorial sea breadth proposals were
rather vehement,'07 with some justified in their concern over the potential danger
from pollution and the threat of military confrontation in areas adjacent to their
national territories. Recognizing these valid interests of the coastal state the
United States put forward specific proposals at the July-August, 1972, meeting
of the Seabed Committee concerning navigational safety in straits and pollution
prevention which should to some extent alleviate the coastal states' concerns.
Specifically, the United States proposed a system of strict liability and coastal
state enforcement for vessels and aircraft transiting straits based on rules and
regulations to be established by the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) (for vessels) and the International Civil Aviation Organ-
ization (for aircraft).' This concession notwithstanding, the United States has
raised the militarism issue and must pay the price for that approach in the nega-
tive reaction of many states. In spite of the reaction, however, the position was
reiterated in August, 1972:
It is our candid assessment that there is no possibility for agreement on
the breadth of the territorial sea other than twelve nautical miles. The
104 Statement of John R. Stevenson before Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee,
August 3, 1971, U.S. Information Service, U.S. Mission to Geneva, at 5; summary in U.N.
Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.4-23 at 47 (1971).
105 See articles 14-17 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
April 29, 1958 [1964], 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 '(in force for the
U.S. Sept. 10, 1964) (hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea Convention).
106 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 14(6).
107 See, e.g., the excerpts from foreign delegations' statements in response to Articles I and
II in Knight, The 1971 United States Proposals on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea and
Passage Through International Straits, supra note 13 at 774-79.
108 See statement of John R. Stevenson before Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee,
July 28, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.37 at 2 (1972).
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United States and others have also made it clear that their vital interests
require that agreement on a twelve mile territorial sea be coupled with
agreement on free transit of straits used for international navigation and
these remain basic elements of our national policy which we will not sac-
rifice 0 9
A counterproposal on the straits passage issue sponsored by eight nations was
submitted during the March-April, 1973, meeting of the Seabed Committee °
That proposal would give great discretion and authority to coastal states with
respect to vessels navigating near their shores. Its clear incompatibility with
United States interests prompted the United States representative to express
"deep disappointment" at the proposal which, in his words, "confused the issue of
passage in the territorial sea in areas other than international straits with the
very different issue of transit through and over international straits."'" Mr.
Moore attempted to clarify the issue by identifying three separate aspects of the
freedoms of navigation and overflight:
[F]irst is the preservation of high seas navigation freedoms beyond the
territorial sea.... [S]uch freedoms should be fully protected in connection
with any possible coastal state economic jurisdiction beyond a 12-mile ter-
ritorial sea ....
[S]econd... is a truly meaningful right of innocent passage within an
agreed 12-mile territorial sea in areas other than straits used for interna-
tional navigation. [With agreement on a 12-mile territorial sea] it will be
even more important to protect the community interest in navigation in the
territorial sea.
iT]ird... is the right of vessels and aircraft of all nations to transit
freely through and over straits used for international navigation ....
[Tihe community interest at stake in international straits is far more vital
than simply the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea. The issue is
no less than whether the freedoms of the high seas enjoyed by all nations
are to remain meaningful."12
The United States representative reiterated these distinctions in the subsequent
(July-August, 1973) meeting of the Seabed Committee. He emphasized that
"the doctrine of innocent passage was not adequate when applied to straits used
for international navigation and did not see any need to revise the concept of
innocent passage . ". .."' In short, it is the straits issue which is paramount"'
109 Statement of John R. Stevenson before the Seabed Committee, August 10, 1972, 67
DEP'T STATE BULL. 382-83 (1972).
110 Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines, Spain and Yemen: Draft
Articles on Navigation Through the Territorial Sea Including Straits Used for International
Navigation, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.18 (1973).
111 Statement of John Norton Moore before Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee,
April 3, 1973, Press Release (United States Mission to the United Nations) USUN-32 (73) at
3; summary in U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.58 at 12 (1973).
112 U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.58 at 11 (1973).
113 Statement of John R. Stevenson before Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee,
July 25, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.70 at 11 '(1973).
114 In his July 25, 1973, statement, Mr. Stevenson was summarized as observing that "his
delegation attached particular importance to the satisfactory resolution of the question of
transit through and over straits in the context of a satisfactory over-all settlement of the law of
the sea." Id. at 10 (emphasis added). In the delicate language of international negotiations,
such phrases as "unable to conceive of a successful Law of the Sea Conference" and "attached
particular importance' indicate matters of the highest national priority.
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and it is clear that the achievement of many other national objectives in the cur-
rent law of the sea negotiations hinges on the United States' ability to achieve
an acceptable agreement concerning navigation in international straits.
D. Freedom of Scientific Research
Although actively promoted by the marine science community in the United
States,"1 5 this nonresource issue did not receive much emphasis in United States
oceans policy deliberations prior to 1973. In draft treaty articles submitted and
statements made before 1973, the only reference to scientific research in the
oceans was contained in the draft seabed treaty which required parties thereto "to
encourage, and to obviate interference with, scientific research.""' 6 However, at
the March-April, 1973, meeting of the Seabed Committee two major speeches on
the subject of marine scientific research were given by representatives of the
United States," 7 and during the July-August, 1973, meeting, the United States
submitted the "Draft Articles for a Chapter on Marine Scientific Research." '
Before analyzing the policy evidenced by these statements and documents, how-
ever, brief digressions on the existing international law of marine scientific re-
search and conflicting views with respect to future international policy are in
order.
Within the territorial sea, a coastal state has an absolute right of refusal with
respect to proposed research activities. On the high seas, which begin legally at
the seaward limit of the territorial sea, and the deep ocean floor, beyond the
limit of the continental shelf, there is no presently recognized right of limitation
of research by coastal states. Article 5 (8) of the Convention on the Continental
Shelf" 9 provides for the following regime with respect to research activities on the
continental shelf:
The consent of the coastal State shall be obtained in respect of any
research concerning the continental shelf and undertaken there. Neverthe-
less, the coastal State shall not normally withhold its consent if the request
is submitted by a qualified institution with a view to purely scientific re-
search into the physical or biological characteristics of the continental shelf,
subject to the proviso that the coastal State shall have the right, if it so
115 See, e.g., Burke, MARINE SCIENCE RESEARCH AND INTERNATIONAL LAw; Fye, Ocean
Science and Marine Resources, in USES OF THE SEAS 17 (E. Gullion, ed. 1968); Clingan,
Scientific Inquiry in the Oceans: Legal Regulation and Responsibility, 6 LEX ET SCIENTIA 77
(1969); Knauss, Development of the Freedom of Scientific Research Issue of the Third Law
of the Sea Conference, 1 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. J. 93 (1973); Schaefer, Freedom of Scientific
Research and Exploration in the Sea, 4 STAN. J. INT'L STUDIES 46 (1969).
116 Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area, supra note 12,
Art. 24.
117 Statement of John Albers before Subcommittee III of the Seabed Committee, March
22, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/SR.36 at 2 (1973); statement of Philip Handler before
Subcommittee III of the Seabed Committee, March 29, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/
SR.37 at 10 (1973). Technically, Dr. Handler was not a member of the United States delega-
tion and spoke only in his capacity as President of the National Academy of Sciences '(U.S.).
As confirmed by later United States initiatives (see text accompanying notes 125-132) however,
the Handler statement did foreshadow the formal United States position on this issue.
118 United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on Marine Scientific Research,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.44 (1973).
119 Supra note 39.
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desires, to participate or to be represented in the research, and that in any
event the results shall be published. 120
Industrialized nations with the potential to convert raw scientific data into
economic benefit or military power tend to favor removal of all limitations on
scientific research in the oceans including those now present with respect to the
continental shelf. Developing nations perceive that completely unrestrained and
unregulated scientific research only promises to widen the economic gap between
developed and developing nations principally because the latter do not possess the
technical skills or industrial wherewithal to gain from such data even should it be
provided to them by the developed nations' research institutes. This perception
has led, as will be noted below, to one of the principal facets of United States
policy on the marine science question. It is within this framework, then, that
one must view the United States policy initiatives.
On March 26, 1973, a member of the United States delegation to the Sea-
bed Committee delivered a paper to Subcommittee III pointing out the research
efforts to date concerning the study of the ocean floor, giving particular emphasis
to the potential benefits to be derived therefrom. Mr. Albers concluded his speech
by emphasizing two points, viz., "the importance of the study of the ocean basins
for knowledge of earth processes, hazards and resources," and that "opportunity
for scientific research should be freely open to all and for the benefit of all."' l"
A week later Dr. Philip Handier, President of the National Academy of Sciences,
delivered a statement to Subcommittee III in which he posited that "science
did, indeed, contribute to technological and economic development"; that much
of today's ocean science was "conducted on a co-ordinated, multiple-ship and
multiple-nation basis"; and therefore, a desirable goal should be "to ensure,
through appropriate treaty agreement, that the realization of the commonly ac-
cepted goals of scientific research at sea [were] facilitated, not hindered.1 22
To balance the obvious concerns of coastal states against this desire for the
facilitation of ocean research, Dr. Handler introduced the National Academy of
Science's proposal for an agreement on marine scientific research. This proposal
has as its heart the distinction between "open research" and "limited research,"
the former being "research intended for the benefit of all mankind and char-
acterized by full publication of results," while the latter is "exploration intended
for the economic benefit of a limited group, as evidenced by restrictions on pub-
lication and the availability of data and samples."' 2 The marine scientific com-
munity, Handler stated, was exclusively concerned with open research. The
proposal would envision no restrictions on basic open research beyond the ter-
ritorial sea and would encourage agreement on open research within the ter-
ritorial sea subject to certain arrangements. 24 Then, on July 19, 1973, the
120 Id. Art. 5(8).
121 Statement of John Albers. supra note 116 at 5.
122 Statement of Philip Handler, supra note 116 at 11-12.
123 Id. at 14.
124 The conditions specified were that (1) the coastal State should be given reasonable
notice of research activities; (2) it should have the opportunity to participate or be represented
in the research; (3) it should have the right to receive copies of all data and samples; (4) it
should be assured that significant research results would be published; and (5) it should be
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United States presented to the Seabed Committee draft treaty articles on the
subject of marine scientific research.12 These draft articles must therefore be
considered as the latest and most authoritative position of the United States on
this topic.
Article 1 sets the tone for the United States policy on the issue by providing
that:
Scientific research in the sea being essential to an understanding of the
global environment, the preservation and enhancement of the sea and its
rational and effective use, States shall promote and facilitate the develop-
ment and conduct of all scientific research in the sea for the benefit of the
international community. All States, irrespective of geographic location, as
well as appropriate international organizations may engage in scientific
research in the sea, recognizing the rights and interests of the international
community and coastal States, particularly the interests and needs of
developing countries, as provided for in this Convention. 26
There then follow a number of provisions concerning the conduct of scientific
research in the oceans, including specifications that (a) such research be con-
ducted with reasonable regard to other uses of the sea (and that such other uses
be conducted with reasonable regard to the conduct of scientific research) 12
(b) such research be conducted with strict and adequate safeguards for the
protection of the marine environment, 2 ' (c) such activities should not form the
legal basis for any claim to any part of the sea or its resources, 2 ' and (d) states
should promote international co-operation in scientific research exclusively for
peaceful purposes. 3
With these preliminaries aside, Article 6 then provides, with respect to the
territorial sea of coastal states, that "[c]oastal States in the exercise of their
sovereignty shall co-operate in facilitating the conduct of scientific research in
their territorial sea and access to their ports by research vessels."'' This follows
the basic approach recommended by the National Academy of Sciences, although
it does little more than place an obligation on coastal states to negotiate in good
faith concerning the conditions of access to their territorial seas by ocean research
vessels and personnel. In that respect it is not unlike the obligation created by
Article 3 of the Convention on the High Seas concerning landlocked states and
their coastal neighbors whereby the latter are required to provide appropriate
transit and port access rights "by common agreement."'3 2  The mandatory
assured that scientific research activities would present no hazard to the resources or uses of
the sea or seabed.
125 United States of America: Draft Articles. for a Chapter on Marine Scientific Research,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.44 (1973).
126 Id. Art. 1.
127 Id. Art. 2.
128 Id. Art. 3.
129 Id. Art. 4.
130 Id. Art. 5. The methods specified in Article 5 to achieve such promotion were (a)
participation in international research programs and encouragement of cooperation in research
by personnel of different nations; (b) effective publication of research programs; and (c) the
strengthening of the research capabilities of developing nations.
131 Id. Art. 6.
132 Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312 T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 '(in force for U.S. Sept. 30, 1962).
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language of Article 3 of the Convention on the High Seas, as well as the man-
datory language of Article 6 of the United States draft articles on marine
scientific research, is qualified ("common agreement," or "cooperation") to
such an extent that in fact no mandatory obligation attaches in either case.
Beyond the limit of the territorial sea and within the area of any economic
resource zone established by agreement, Article 7 provides:
States and appropriate international organizations shall ensure that their
vessels conducting scientific research shall respect the rights and interests of
the coastal State in its exercise of such jurisdiction, and for this purpose
shall
a. provide the coastal State at least- days advance notification of in-
tent to do such research, containing a description of the research project
which shall be kept up to date;
b. certify that the research will be conducted in accordance with this
Convention by a qualified institution with a view to purely scientific re-
search;
c. ensure that the coastal State has all appropriate opportunities to
participate or be represented in the research project directly or through an
appropriate international institution of its choice; the coastal State shall
give reasonable advance notification of its desire to participate or be repre-
sented in the research within - days after it has received notification;
d. ensure that all data and samples are shared with the coastal State;
e. ensure that significant research remlts are published as soon as pos-
sible in an open readily available scientific publication and supplied directly
to the coastal State;
f. assist the coastal State in assessing the implications for its interests of
the data and results directly or through the procedures established pursuant
to Article 5;
g. ensure compliance with all applicable international environmental
standards, including those established or to be established by [appropriate
organizations]. 8 3
Beyond the limit of an economic resource zone, scientific research would,
presumably, be subject to no national restrictions.
The United States proposal would reverse the "burden of proof" from the
regime of Article 5 (8) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf by permitting
research to proceed after expiration of a notice period provided that certain
assurances are given and certain conditions concerning the conduct of the
expedition observed. The only power of the coastal state (in addition, of course,
to being able to compel adherence to the assurances and conditions) is to have
representation in the venture.
In the general debate on the scientific research issue in the Seabed Commit-
tee, it has become clear that developing coastal states will probably be reluctant
to support an open research proposal such as that proffered by the United
States unless some quid pro quo can be secured. The most often discussed of such
bargaining elements is the provision of technical assistance to developing states in
return for the right of access. To date there have been much confusion and little
133 United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on Marine Scientific Research,
U.N. Doe. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.44.Art. 7 (1973).
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understanding of precisely what is meant by the concept of "technical assistance"
(or "technology transfer" as it is sometimes called) in the context of the law of
the sea negotiations. In his speech of July 24, 1973, introducing the draft treaty
articles on marine scientific research, Mr. McKernan attempted to clarify the
United States position on this issue. The summary record reports that:
With regard to the developing countries, he had already stated in
August 1972 that the United States was willing to support multilateral efforts
to enable those countries to interpret and use scientific data for their own
benefit, to broaden their knowledge in the field of marine scientific research,
and to obtain equipment for such research. His delegation reaffirmed its
willingness to consider specific proposals in that respect. He hoped that such
proposals would be made during the debate on the transfer of research
technology. It would also be useful to establish regional centres for training
in marine science. International machinery could be established to assist
the developing countries in assessing for their own interests the implications
of research data and results. The United States had proposed that the flag-
State of research vessels should be required to assist the coastal State in
interpreting data and results when scientific research was conducted in
areas beyond the territorial sea, where the coastal State exercised jurisdiction
over sea-bed resources and coastal fisheries.134
In a subsequent statement on the same day, Mr. McKernan elaborated upon
this theme, noting that the technical assistance program which the United States
envisioned was a two stage process involving, first, the receipt of assistance by
developing nations in interpreting data about marine areas of concern to them
in a manner favorable to their interests, and second, the development of means
"to enable all countries not only to interpret the data for themselves, but also to
engage in scientific research in the marine environment."'3 5 McKernan also
reiterated the United States willingness, in principle, to commit funds to support:
[M]ultilateral efforts by all appropriate international agencies to create and
enlarge the ability of developing States to interpret and use data for their
economic benefit and other purposes; to augment their expertise in the field
of research; and to obtain scientific research equipment." 6
To summarize, the United States suports a regime imposing as few restrictions on
marine scientific research as politically feasible, while offering, as quid pro quo
for such a regime, technical and financial support for an as yet ill-defined
program of technical assistance.
E. Protection of the Marine Environment
Elements of the United States oceans policy with respect to protection of
the marine environment from degradation by pollution are contained in virtually
all of the proposals and policy statements issued to date. Outside the context of
the Seabed Committee, the United States has pressed for agreement on the ocean
134 Statement of Donald L. McKernan before Subcommittee III of the Seabed Committee,
July 20, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/SRI42 at 7 (1973).
135 Id. at 16.
136 Id.
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dumping convention which was signed in London last year, 37 and is working
with the institutions being established as a follow-up to the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Human Environment on land based pollution issues. It is the United
States' view that these two issues are beyond the competence and mandate of the
Seabed Committee and that the latter group should limit its antipollution con-
cern to seabed mineral exploitation matters and certain aspects of vessel pollu-
tion."' In that regard, the United States supports the concept of strict liability
with respect to cleanup costs and pollution damage from seabed exploration and
exploitation activities.
The United States is also working within the IMCO on the problem of
spillage from accidents involving tankers carrying crude petroleum, as well as
general navigational safety, including mandatory shipping routes and separation
lanes.
Within the Seabed Committee, the United States has submitted two major
policy documents-first, a working paper on competence to establish standards
for the control of vessel source pollution,"3 9 and second, a set of draft treaty
articles on the protection of the marine environment and the prevention of marine
pollution.'" In the working paper the United States commented on the sources
of marine pollution, suggesting that with respect to land based sources "the Sea-
bed Committee does not have the expertise to deal adequately with the tech-
nical aspects of these complex problems."'' Natural seepage of oil from the
seabed was also dismissed from consideration since there was "no known method
of controlling this source."' 42 Pollution from seabed mineral development,
although contributing only five per cent of nonland-based ocean pollution, was
nevertheless dealt with in the draft seabed treaty and was therefore not discussed
in the working paper.' Pollution from vessels, constituting ninety-five per cent
of nonland-based ocean pollution, was identified in the working paper as the
major topic of that presentation. Three principal methods of introducing pol-
lutants into the marine environment from vessels were identified: (1) collisions
and other maritime casualties, (2) loading and bunkering operations, and (3)
operational discharges. 4 The paper noted that the latter source was the major
contributor to vessel pollution.
The issue dealt with in the substantive portion of the paper was the "con-
sideration of standards to control vessel source pollution," and, more specifically,
"the authority to establish standards which will eliminate or minimize environ-
mental damage caused by vessels."' 45 The paper concluded that "[o]nly a system
137 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, adopted at London, November 13, 1972, open for signature from December 29, 1972,
until December 31, 1973. reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1294 (1972).
138 See the statement of John R. Stevenson before Subcommittee III of the Seabed Com-
mittee, August 2, 1972, U.N. Doe. A/AC.138/SC.III/SR.25 at 2 (1973). See also Pollution
Working Paper, supra note 20 at 1-2.
139 Pollution Working Paper, supra note 20.
140 United States Draft Articles on the Protection of the Marine Environment and the
Prevention of Marine Pollution, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.40 (1973).
141 Pollution Working Paper, supra note 20 at 1-2.
142 Id. at 2.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 2-5.
145 Id. at 5.
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of exclusively international standards will provide an effective means to control
vessel source pollution while protecting the community interest in both of these
fundamental objectives."' 46  In support of the proposition that coastal states
should not be the exclusive arbiters of international pollution standards, the work-
ing paper enumerated five reasons in support of internationally established
standards:
(1) The necessity for ensuring a proper balance between environ-
mental protection and avoiding unnecessary increases in transportation
costs;
(2) The necessity for uniform standards to be observed by all states;
(3) The achievement of "effective" protection of the full marine
environment (noting the unity of the world ocean and the proper
transfer of pollutants by currents);
(4) The responsiveness of an international approach to changes in
the technology for the control of pollution and to new knowledge about
threats to the marine environment; and
(5) The prospects for elimination of competitive economic con-
cerns arising from imposition of environmental controls by one state
that other states might not impose.'
The working paper concluded with a summary of vessel source pollution:
Standards for the control of vessel source pollution must effectively
protect the fundamental environment and navigational interests of all
nations. If authority to establish such standards were given to coastal States,
whether that authority were exclusive or only supplemental, there could be
no assurance that adequate account would be taken of the need to ac-
commodate such interests. There could also be no assurance that such
standards would effectively serve either interest. This does not mean that
special standards could not be established to deal with the problems of
special areas, but such standards should be established internationally. The
global nature of the marine pollution problem requires that solutions to
this problem, as with other international problems, must be international. 148
The draft articles on pollution present a definitive source of the United States
policy position on marine pollution. Those articles will be briefly summarized
below.
With respect to the competence to establish standards to protect the marine
environment, Article III authorizes the seabed organization established by the
Third Conference to establish international standards with respect to seabed
activities (within and beyond any economic resource zone), and authorizes
IMCO114 9 to establish international standards with respect to vessels. 5  Such
146 Id.
147 Id. at 5-6.
148 Id. at 7.
149 Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, March 6,
1948 (1958), 9 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044, 289 U.N.T.S. 48 (in force for U.S. March 17,
1958).
150 United States Draft Articles on the Protection of the Marine Environment and the
Prevention of Marine Pollution, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.40 Art. III(1),(2) (1973).
[December 1973]
UNITED STATES OCEANS POLICY
standards may, according to Article III, "include special standards for special
areas and problems, taking into account particular ecological circumstances.""ul
The United States, apparently anticipating the criticism of the proposal with
respect to the role of IMCO, which has been denounced by many developing
nations as being little more than an instrumentality of the maritime powers,
explained the action it had taken within IMCO to ensure broad representation
and effectiveness of operation.
To ensure that new problems were adequately and rapidly dealt with
and that all countries interested in participating in the establishment of
such standards would have an opportunity to do so, the United States had
proposed in the IMCO Council the creation of a marine environment
protection committee for dealing with vessel-source pollution. That com-
mittee, whose membership would be open to all interested States, would be
empowered to adopt regulations and circulate them directly to Governments
without review or approval by the IMCO Assembly or Council. The regu-
lations would then come into effect automatically unless opposed by a
specified number, or category, of States.
52
Article IV requires states to "adopt laws and regulations implementing
international standards," and provides further that they "may adopt and imple-
ment higher standards" in three situations: (a) in the exercise of their rights in
their economic resource zone with respect to resource extractive activities and
other permitted activities therein; (b) for vessels entering their ports and offshore
facilities; and (c) for their nationals, natural or juridical, and vessels registered
in their territory or flying their flag. 3
The remainder of the articles deal with the knottier problem of enforcement
of such standards. Coastal states are provided authority to enforce standards in
their economic resource zones with respect to activities over which they have
jurisdiction, although the international seabed agency is given a right of inspec-
tion to ensure compliance." With respect to vessels, a state is given enforcement
authority with respect to vessels registered in its territory and flying its flag, vessels
using its ports or offshore facilities, irrespective of the location of the violation,
and vessels in its territorial sea for violations therein. 5 5
Section D of the draft articles contains provisions relating to cooperative en-
forcement measures against vessels, including the rights to monitor vessels and to
deny ports of entry to non-complying vessels. 5 ' A cooperative system between
port states, flag states, and coastal states with respect to alleged violations of
international standards is also set forth.157 A summary of the respective roles of
flag, port, and coastal states was given by the United States representative in
his tabling speech for the draft articles where he observed that:
151 Id. Art. III(3).
152 Statement of John Norton Moore before Subcommittee III of the Seabed Committee,
July 18, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/SR.41 at 3 (1973).
153 Draft Articles on Pollution, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.40 Art. IV (1973).
154 Id. Art. VI.
155 Id. Art. VII.
156 Id. Arts. VIII and IX.
157 Id. Arts. X through XIII.
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The flag State would continue to have enforcement responsibilities
over its vessels, although such authority would not be exclusive, and would
assume a specific obligation to enforce international standards in the case of
vessels flying its flag, subject to the right of other States to have recourse to
compulsory dispute settlement procedures to ensure that the obligation was
fully discharged.
The port State would be able to enforce pollution control standards in
the case of vessels using its ports, regardless of where violations took place.
The coastal State would have rights and remedies that would fully
protect its environmental interests; provision was made for dealing with
the four major marine pollution problems facing a coastal State: serious
maritime casualties off its coasts, violations of international standards
presenting imminent danger of major harmful consequences, persistent and
unreasonable failure of a State to enforce the international standards with
respect to vessels flying its flag, and general violations of the standards.
58
Section E deals with extraordinary enforcement measures and intervention
against vessels, providing specifically that:
Beyond the territorial sea, a coastal State may take such reasonable
emergency enforcement measures as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate,
or eliminate imminent danger of major harmful damage to its coast or
related interests from pollution arising from a particular occurrence reason-
ably believed to be related to a violation of the appliable international
standards. 59
Naval vessels are exempted from the coverage of the draft articles through a
provision on sovereign immunity providing each state ensure "that all such
vessels and aircraft owned or operated by it act in a manner consistent with the
object and purpose of this Chapter."'0 ° Finally, it should be noted that the flag-
state, port-state approach of the United States is designed primarily to avoid the
creation of pollution control zones extending throughout the economic resource
areas which will inevitably be created at the Third Conference. In a statement
made during the July-August, 1973, meeting of the Seabed Committee, the
United States representative pointed out that the majority of the coastal nations
of the world were "zone locked," i.e., vessels bound from their ports to areas
beyond any economic resource zone would of necessity pass through the economic
resource zone (and, if the zonal approach were taken, the pollution control zone)
of at least one other nation. 6' If pollution control zones were used to inhibit
maritime transport, the effect would obviously be felt not only by the United
States and other maritime powers, but by the majority of the world's coastal
nations.
In summary, the United States policy on protection of the marine environ-
ment within the context of the law of the sea negotiations appears to consist of
the following elements: (1) land based pollution is beyond the scope of the law
of the sea negotiations and must be dealt with in another forum; (2) pollution
158 Statement of John Norton Moore, supra note 151, at 4.
159 Draft Articles on Pollution, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.40 Art. XV (1973).
160 Id. Art. XXIII.
161 Statement by John Norton Moore before the Seabed Committee, August 13, 1973, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.138/SR.100 at 7 (1973).
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from seabed mineral extraction activities should be controlled by the establish-
ment of international standards by the seabed authority to be created and en-
forced by the state in whose economic resource zone the activity takes place;
and (3) vessel pollution should be controlled by the establishment of interna-
tional standards by IMCO, implemented by coastal states in areas subject to their
jurisdiction, and enforced by a joint flag-port-coastal state cooperative effort.
IV. Congressional Endorsement
While by no means supporting Administration oceans policy in every
particular, both houses of Congress did during 1973 adopt resolutions which
provided endorsement of the general objectives envisioned in the President's
ocean policy statement of May 23, 1970.2 These objectives were specified in
the Senate resolution s as:
(1) [P]rotection of-
(a) the freedoms of the high seas, beyond a twelve-mile territorial sea,
for navigation, communication, and scientific research, 16 4 and
(b) free transit through and over international straits;
(2) recognition of the following international community rights: 1 5
(a) protection from ocean pollution.
(b) assurance of the integrity of investments.
(c) substantial sharing of revenues derived from exploitation of the
seabed particularly for the benefit 6 of developing countries,
(d) compulsory settlement of disputes, and
(e) protection of other reasonable uses of the oceans, beyond the ter-
ritorial sea including any economic intermediate zone (if agreed upon) ;
(3) an effective International Seabed Authority to regulate orderly and
just development of the mineral resources of the deep seabed as the com-
mon heritage of mankind, protecting the interests of both developing and
developed countries;
(4) conservation and protection of living resources with fisheries
regulated for maximum sustainable yield, with coastal State management
of coastal and anadromous species,' 7 and international management of such
migratory species as tuna.
Three brief comments are in order on this resolution (and its House counterpart).
First, the term "protection" (paragraph one) is rather broad and leaves open
substantial room for negotiation. To give but one example, "protection of ...
162 Nixon, supra note 10.
163 S. Res. 82, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CoNG. REc. 12810 (1973).
164 The House version of the resolution, H. R. Res. 330, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., 119 CONG.
REc. 2310 (1973), provides in this section for protection of "freedom of the seas, beyond a
twelve-mile territorial sea, for navigation, commerce, transportation, communication, and
scientific research," thus broadening slightly the coverage.
165 The House version speaks of "recognition of the following international community
interests," which is more accurate, H. R. Res. 330, supra note 163.
166 The House version uses the words "economic assistance" rather than "benefit."
167 The House version refers to "coastal state management of anadromous species, and
host state management of anadromous species," which, again, is probably more accurate.
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scientific research" would undoubtedly encompass agreement such as that
proposed in the United States draft treaty articles on marine scientific research
which affords some role to the coastal state.
Second, the five subitems set out in paragraph two are identical with the
five elements proposed by the United States as being necessary for that nation's
acceptance of the economic resource zone concept (and which were also in-
cluded in the original May 23, 1970, presidential oceans policy statement).
Within the generality of both the presidential statement and the congressional
resolutions, there is sufficient room for negotiation such that optimal outcomes
can be achieved. If either the presidential statement or the congressional
resolutions had gone into more detail, that necessary flexibility would have been
regrettably lost.
Finally, the paragraph of the resolution dealing with fisheries endorses the
"species" approach discussed above. As noted earlier, international acceptance
of the species approach does not seem particularly likely at this time-a zone
regime being the more probable outcome of the Third Conference. It should be
noted that the congressional resolutions only "endorse" the policies presently
being pursued and do not limit that endorsement to these policies alone, nor do
they reject future endorsement of other policies. Were this not the case, para-
graph four of the resolutions might disadvantageously lock the United States
negotiators into a position which was not readily salable.
In sum, it appears that both the Administration and the Congress agree on
the basic outlines of United States oceans policy.
V. Conclusion
At the time of submission of this article, there were serious questions whether
the Third Conference would be initiated on schedule in Santiago because of
insufficient progress of preparatory work. Because of the vast array of national
and international objectives of major importance to be dealt with at the Third
Conference, this would be a most unwelcome development for all mankind. At
whatever pace the negotiations and deliberations proceed, it cannot be denied
that the policies developed and pursued by the government of the United States
of America will have a profound effect on the ultimate outcome. Thus all
citizens, and especially members of the bar, should be fully aware of the United
States policy on ocean affairs and should make their influence felt whether they
support or disagree with that policy. It has been the purpose of this article to
provide a factual discussion of United States oceans policy in hopes that more
individuals will be in a position to take an active role in shaping and developing
that policy as it ripens into international law.
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ANNEX
"United States Policy for the Seabed" Statement by President Nixon, May 23, 1970
The nations of the world are now facing decisions of momentous importance to man's use
of the oceans for decades ahead. At issue is whether the oceans will be used rationally and
equitably and for the benefit of mankind or whether they will become an arena of unrestrained
exploitation and conflicting jurisdictional claims in which even the most advantaged states will
be losers.
The issue arises now-and with urgency-because nations have grown increasingly con-
scious of the wealth to be exploited from the seabeds and throughout the waters above and
because they are also becoming apprehensive about ecological hazards of unregulated use of
the oceans and seabeds. The stark fact is that the law of the sea is inadequate to meet the
needs of modem technology and the concerns of the international community. If it is not
modernized multilaterally, unilateral action and international conflict are inevitable.
This is the time, then, for all nations to set about resolving the basic issues of the future
regime for the oceans-and to resolve it in a way that redounds to the general benefit in the
era of intensive exploitation that lies ahead. The United States, as a major maritime power
and a leader in ocean technology to unlock the riches of the ocean, has a special responsibility
to move this effort forward.
Therefore, I am today proposing that all nations adopt as soon as possible a treaty under
which they would renounce all national claims over the natural resources of the seabed beyond
the point where the high seas reach a depth of 200 meters (218.8 yards) and would agree to
regard these resources as the common heritage of mankind.
The treaty should establish an international regime for the exploitation of seabed resources
beyond this limit. The regime should provide for the collection of substantial mineral royalties
to be used for international community purposes, particularly economic assistance to developing
countries. It should also establish general rules to prevent unreasonable interference with other
uses of the ocean, to protect the ocean from pollution, to assure the integrity of the investment
necessary for such exploitation, and to provide for peaceful and compulsory settlement of
disputes.
I propose two types of machinery for authorizing exploitation of seabed resources beyond
a depth of 200 meters.
First, I propose that coastal nations act as trustees for the international community in an
international trusteeship zone comprised of the continental margins beyond a depth of 200
meters off their coasts. In return, each coastal state would receive a share of the inter-
national revenues from the zone in which it acts as trustee and could impose additional
taxes if these were deemed desirable.
As a second step, agreed international machinery would authorize and regulate exploration
and use of seabed resources beyond the continental margins.
The United States will introduce specific proposals at the next meeting of the United
Nations Seabeds Committee to carry out these objectives.
Although I hope agreement on such steps can be reached quickly, the negotiation of
such a complex treaty may take some time. I do not, however, believe it is either necessary or
desirable to try to halt exploration and exploitation of the seabeds beyond a depth of 200
meters during the negotiating process.
Accordingly, I call on other nations to join the United States in an interim policy. I sug-
gest that all permits for exploration and exploitation of the seabeds beyond 200 meters be issued
subject to the international regime to be agreed upon. The regime should accordingly include
due protection for the integrity of investments made in the interim period. A substantial por-
tion of the revenues derived by a state from exploitation beyond 200 meters during this
interim period should be turned over to an appropriate international development agency for
assistance to developing countries. I would plan to seek appropriate congressional action to
make such funds available as soon as a sufficient number of other states also indicate their
willingness to join this interim policy.
I will'propose necessary changes in the domestic import and tax laws and regulations of the
United States to assure that our own laws and regulations do not discriminate against U.S.
nationals operating in the trusteeship zone off our coast or under the authority of the interna-
tional machinery to be established.
It is equally important to assure unfettered and harmonious use of the oceans as an
avenue of commerce and transportation and as a source of food. For this reason the United
States is currently engaged with other states in an effort to obtain a new law-of-the-sea treaty.
This treaty would establish a 12-mile limit for territorial seas and provide for free transit
through international straits. It would also accommodate the problems of developing countries
and other nations regarding the conservation and use of the living resources of the high seas.
I believe that these proposals are essential to the interests of all nations, rich and poor,
coastal and landlocked, regardless of their political systems. If they result in international
agreements, we can save over two-thirds of the earth's surface from national conflict and
rivalry, protect it from pollution, and put it to use for the benefit of all. This would be a
fitting achievement for this 25th anniversary year of the United Nations. "
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